The Accord of Instability

• Arash M. Akbari is a research associate at the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). Background of International Law and MA Candidate in International Affairs MAIA Programme @JohnsHopkinsSAIS. He writes mostly about Iran, Middle Eastern security affairs, and diplomatic relations.

The volatile geopolitics of the Middle East and North Africa and its unstable balance of power in the aftermath of the “Arab Spring” has correspondingly developed the political relations between Israel and the Arab states around the Persian Gulf strategically stronger and diplomatically denser. Seeing that, it is still unknown whether or not these agreements were solely populist policies of Trump’s last days in the Oval Office; or a legitimate memorandum of understanding in which may lead the region into an emerging era of peace and stability. In light of the above, focusing on the geopolitics of the region, this short essay will elucidate the political and security agendas behind these normalisation deals. Furthermore, this essay will also argue that these peace agreements were populistically politicised and are not necessarily advantageous for the peacekeeping process and the strength of regional stability.

Signed in August 2020, the “Abraham Accords Peace Agreement” initiated a symbolic phase of normalisation between the Israeli state and their Arab counterparts in the region. Since the Israeli-Egyptian or the Israeli-Jordanian peace comprehensive agreements in 1970’s and 1990’s, this is the first occasion that an Arab state is officially and comprehensively initiates its political and trade relations with the state of Israel. However, unlike the peace agreements in 1970’s and 1990’s, between Israelis, Egyptians and Jordanians respectively, the Abraham Accords and its following agreements with Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco were influenced by political agendas rather than territorial contests.

Given that the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco and Sudan did not have any territorial conflicts with Israel and were not discussing the matter of the illegally invaded lands of Palestine by the Israeli forces, the political and security aspects of these agreements are on the point of convergence. Thus, the question remains; what was the main derivative behind the structure of these normalisation agreements? What was the advantage for the United States to play the mediatory role in the engagement of these agreements? To understand the answer to these questions, a broader geopolitical vision in required.

The balance of power in the Middle East and North Africa has played a vital role in the construction of these political agreements. The emergence of regional military powers and their defensive deterrent capabilities disrupted the traditional imperialist security design of the region. Nowadays, classic military powers such as the United States, China and Russia are not the only dominant military forces in the region. Hence, in addition to arms being purchased from these traditional powers that are not in the region, Arab states seek for a regional alliance to deter potential imminent threats.

Security and ideological threats from newly emerged regional revisionist actors such as the Islamic Republic of Iran and Turkey has subsequently influenced the engagement of the Abraham Accords and its following agreement with Bahrain. On the other hand, Israel’s influence will reach the borders of Iran in which can ignite regional conflict. Therefore, the supporters of the deal, mainly the United States that acted as the mediator cannot claim that such deals will bring peace and security to the region.

Consequently, in the last days of 2020, following the rising tensions between Iran, the US and Israel, an Israeli navy submarine has entered the Persian Gulf through the Strait of Hormuz for the first time in history. Such provoking and offensive military actions are the result of Israel’s overwhelmed confidence in which were shaped through the Abraham Accords agreements. Conversely, Iran has also offensively reacted to these agreements through diplomatic missions and defensive military exercises in the Persian Gulf. Therefore, these offensive actions by both sides of the contest caused by the populist agreement of Abraham Accords does not preserve regional stability.

Islamic Republic of Iran’s growing influence and its ballistic missile capabilities has become Israel’s and GCC states’ most pressing threat. Be that as it may, United States political intentions in the Middle East varies in different administration; Turkey is collaborating in a strategic alliance with Qatar, and Iran is developing its military capabilities; UAE and Bahrain were inspired to normalise their relations with Israel to preserve their own national interest. However, unlike other regional strategic partnerships and alliances, the presence of Israel in the Persian Gulf will be problematic for Iran and Turkey’s national security.

Specifically, Iran which is fundamentally against the principles of Zionist ideology and Israeli far right political views. Therefore, Israeli’s active presence in this region can subsequently trigger inevitable conflicts and destabilise the region. In conclusion, this essay suggests that such populist deals mediated by the United States can retrieve the obsolete ideological differences between regional states on the matter of Israeli-Palestinian conflict and proportionately re-escalate regional tension. Although in short term the Abraham Accords portrays stability, normalisation and prosperity, but considering the above mentioned potential consequences, its long term regional damages are inevitable.