National Interests or Revolutionism?

• Arash M. Akbari is a research associate at the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). Background of International Law and MA Candidate in International Affairs MAIA Programme @JohnsHopkinsSAIS. He writes mostly about Iran, Middle Eastern security affairs, and diplomatic relations.

Introduction

In the midst of the evolution of foreign policy theories, practices and their transformation into modern world politics, due to its profound ties with cultural history and religious ideologies, Middle Eastern states often encourage cultural perspectives in determining their strategic culture. Be that as it may, the Islamic Republic of Iran is one of the states in the Middle East in which has experienced prominent presence of religious derivatives and ideological positions in its strategic culture. Given the above, this paper will argue that the Islamic Republic of Iran and its foreign policy is influenced by religious and ideological agendas. Some in which strengthens their foreign policy and some in which threatens their national interests. This essay will discuss to what extent are elements of revolutionary Shi’ism, anti-Wahhabism and anti-Zionism prominent in Iran’s foreign policy and in its strategic culture? How has Iran managed to balance the relationship between ideological positions and national interest in shaping its strategic culture? To what extent have these concepts shaped the principles, direction and choices of Iran’s foreign policy?

Nowadays, influential states in the Middle East are seeking for regional hegemonic power. These states tend to employ different strategies and implement different policies to achieve their hegemonic target. Seeing that, power dynamics such as military expansion, foreign interventions, and ideological influences are being utilised by leaders and their states to capture a hegemonic power over the region. However, Islamic Republic of Iran has shown to be capable of employing all the above strategies to retain its leadership, sustain its regional power and deter imminent threats to its national interests. This essay will discuss how has Iran exploited power dynamics in the region by gaining ideological and religious legitimacy? Through this paper, Iran’s foreign policy within specific events will be analysed to portray how has Iran been able to utilise revolutionary Shi’ism against Wahhabism and Zionism to obtain legitimacy, gain regional influence and become a major player in the region.

Shi’ism and Theocratic Governance

In the aftermath of the ‘Islamic Revolution’ in 1979, Iran’s constitution, pillars of governance and decision making system encountered an infrastructural transformation. Rules of Sharia Law[1] and Islamic jurisprudence have merged into the structure of Iran’s national law and domestic polity. Introducing revolutionary Shi’ism into its political identity equipped Iran with a self-legitimisation mechanism to facilitate the state in decision making systems influencing both domestic and foreign policies.[2] Certain theocratical concepts such as ijtihad[3], ghayba[4] and taqiyya[5] have assisted the newly emerged revolutionary state to gain its control over the country, exploit social power dynamics, and develop its presence in the region through its self-legitimised foreign policy. To get a better understanding on the implication of the above mentioned concepts of Shi’ism, we must observe their alterations within the political structure of Iran’s decision making system. Through the concept of ghayba, Shia’ jurisprudence suggests that the 12th Imam and the last legitimised leader of the Islamic world has gone through occultation and in his absence Shia’ jurists have the legitimacy and responsibility to look after the leadership. Through the concept of ijtihad Shia’ jurists are able to independently interpret the Quran and announce religious commands (fatwas). Lastly, through the concept of taqiyya, Shia’ jurist is permitted to precautionarily dissimulate or deny religious beliefs in order to maintain peace and security in a pragmatic perspective.[6]

The above mentioned religious concepts and their adaptations allows the Supreme Leader, the state and the Islamic jurist community of Iran to be politically and theocratically flexible in designing polity and shaping Iran’s foreign policy. Given that, Iran and the Supreme Leader is capable of designing different domestic or foreign policies, legitimising them through Shia’ jurisprudence, ratifying them through the parliament and implementing them by the government or other executive branches of the state. Thus, looking through a pragmatic perspective, Islamic Republic of Iran is capable of moderating ideological positions into polity and foreign policies in order to retain its pillars of leadership within the country and sustain its influential presence beyond borders. [7]

To expand on that, this essay points out the designation of Syria as the strategic dept of Iran’s national interest. In order to maintain its regional influence in the Middle East and the Levant, Iran realised the importance of Syria and its geopolitical relevance in Iran’s regional expansion agenda. To legitimise its presence and activities in Syria, Iranian clerics announced Syria as the holy land of Shia’s and morally obliged the Shia’ community to protect the land. Since there are a couple of holy religious Shia’ shrines located in Syria, clerics were capable in exploiting the power dynamics of the society in legitimising Iranian presence, consultations, military activities and economic assistance in Syria. Therefore, through a theocratic perspective and an ideological position, a strategic foreign policy has been addressed pragmatically.

Foreign Policy and Theocracy

Pragmatism is the notion that moderates ideological positions into polity and foreign policy in Iran. The balance between national security and ideological concepts of Shi’ism is the deriving vehicle of Islamic Republic of Iran’s strategic culture. By self-legitimising each other, these two aspects of Iran’s foreign and domestic policies respectively exploit the power dynamics of the society and form pragmatic policies in which are both ideologically accepted and in favour of the national interest.[8] Through these concepts, Iran has been able to legitimise its presence in the region in a form of a peremptory self-defence mission, both defending its ideological beliefs and national interest. Ideological positions allow the state to gain the trust and support of the religious majority of the population and legitimise their actions amongst the society.

A flexible theocratic system in which is empowered by religious power dynamics of their jurist leader that utilises the concept of ijtihad to independently interpret Islamic Sharia’ law and jurisprudence. Not specifically the Supreme Leader himself, but a wide number of clerics with a wide range of followers amongst the society. Furthermore, HasanKhani also suggests that ideological positions and national interest have an “implicatory accommodation, advantageous interaction and synergistic relation” with each other to a degree in which they shape, legitimise and guide Iran’s foreign policy and design its strategic culture. But to what extent has ideological elements of Shi’ism preserved its prominent presence in Iran’s foreign policy and strategic culture?

Ideological elements of Shi’ism consist of the legitimacy of 12 Shia’ Imams in ruling over the Islamic world, independency of Islamic jurists (mujtahids) along the period of occultation (ghayba) in interpreting and reasoning Islamic laws and norms based on Quran; and lastly pragmatic precautions in which allows Shia’ Islam to drift away from its original concepts. These pragmatic precautions (taqiyya) are allowing the religion to adapt itself with the modern community and post-modern cultures. But to what extent has these concepts shaped Iran’s foreign policy and designed its strategic culture? A compare and contrast between the above mentioned Shia’ concepts and religious positions of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia can portray the ongoing ideological and political contests around the Persian Gulf. Theocratically, Wahhabis do not believe any reinterpretations of Islam and did not legitimise the governance of the 12 Shia’ Imams. They condemn any shifts away from the original concepts of Islam and do not tolerate any drifts from traditional concepts of Salafism or Wahhabism. [9]

These ideological concepts allow the heads of both states to claim their own legitimacy in becoming the leader of the Muslim world. Theological legitimacies often provide states with political and social legitimacies. A legitimacy in which can be utilised through foreign policy in developing and maintaining hegemonic power. Religious communities are often vulnerable through their ideological beliefs and states tend to exploit the power dynamics of the society by confronting an opposing ideology.[10]

Decision Making System and Legitimacy

In addition to theocratic prominent components of Iran’s foreign policy and in contrast with Islamic Republic’s mere visible religious identity, there is a professional and political bureaucratic system involved in the designation of Iran’s strategic culture and formation of Iran’s foreign policy. Conversely, this political decision-making mechanism tends to prioritise national security over all the other affective and religious aspects. The two institutions of Supreme National Security Council and the Expediency Discernment Council are the two main pillars of Iran’s decision-making unit in which consists of politicians, ex-military commanders, representatives of the Supreme Leader and economists.

These two institutions have been designed to form a buffer zone between the Supreme Leader, the legislative and the executive branch of the system.[11] In other words, these institutions have been designed to influentially balance the implications of theocracy and national interest to prioritise pragmatic policies in favour of the whole system. Policies in which serve the theocracy as well as the national interest. But the question that remains is that how ideology and theocratic positions play their role in influencing Iran’s strategic culture, or we better say legitimising Iran’s strategic culture?

In the context of legitimacy, the decision making unit of the Islamic Republic of Iran tries to keep the distance close with the supreme leader and the clergy group to retain its religious legitimacy to make decisions for a Muslim population. Given that, the decision making system fears that a lack of legitimacy may disrupt their social contract with the nation and cause mass unrests. The theocratic legitimacy of the decision making system is obtained from the trust of the ‘Vali-e-Faqīh’[12] in the system. In the case of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei as the Vali-e-Faqīh of the country and the Shia’ community beyond the Iranian borders have social power dynamics to legitimise a decision or delegitimise a system.[13] This sort of legitimising and delegitimising capability is the result of Iran’s offensive Shi’ism against regional counterparts since the Islamic revolution in 1979. The offensive ideological position in which respectively legitimises the Supreme Leader and the decision making system in Iran amongst the internal population and external actors. Thus, the claim of being the ‘Vali-e-amr-e-muslemin’ or the guardian of all Muslim communities has not only legitimised the Supreme Leader in the context of internal affairs but also expanded Islamic Republic of Iran’s influence across the region and Islamic nations. This is how Shi’ism formed Iran’s foreign policy and strategic culture in the region.

Islamic Realpolitik: Polity and Foreign Policy

Nowadays, to be able to understand Islamic Republic of Iran’s intentions and strategies in the region, policy makers must observe both Iran’s domestic and foreign policy. The Islamic influenced realism in Tehran is the result of theocratic domestic strategies and pragmatic foreign policies. in the after math of the Islamic Revolution, theocracy and pragmatism formed a symbiotic relationship in which each concept empowered the other concept.[14] On one hand domestic theocratised policies are designed to consolidate domestic controlling power and pragmatic foreign policies to retain Iran’s influence in the region and sustain its political dynamics within the context of international relations. However, the symbiotic relationship between theocracy and pragmatism in discourses of polity and foreign policy have had different ratios in the past four decades. The first years of the revolution, the state began to implement a more theocratic based polity and foreign policy in order to consolidate the newly revolutionised nation. The eight years of war with Iraq has also provoked traditional religious positions and ideological theories within the structure of foreign policy to maintain national unity. Although, after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 and the political empowerment of Ayatollah Khamenei and Ayatollah Rafsanjani, the theocratic/pragmatic ratio of Iran’s two level polity and foreign policy began to shift into a more moderate and pragmatic phase.[15] A phase in which gradually allowed the Islamic Republic of Iran to utilise ideological positions such as anti-Wahhabism and anti-Zionism and penetrate the region with its political influences as a combination soft and hard power. A combination in which portrays Iran’s Islamic realpolitik in the context of its strategic culture.

Religious uniformity of the Iranian population and the social power of Islamic jurist leaders in exploiting the power dynamics of the society and their ability of mobilising the masses to actions illustrates the prominent influence of culture on Iran’s foreign policy. In addition to religious factors, Persian nationalist identity tied with Iran’s rich history is also a major key factor in determining Iran’s foreign policy and strategic culture.[16] One argues that a combination of nationalist and religious factors is the main component of Iran’s discourse with external actors. Although, during different presidencies in Iran, the state took different approaches and illustrated different visions of Iran’s strategic culture. Respectively, as Iran’s foreign policy was shifting between religious and nationalist aspects, ideological positions against Wahhabism and Zionism remained constant in Iran’s regional strategy. The ideological, political and military hegemonic intentions of Iran formed its modern deterrence strategy and shaped its current strategic culture. Prominent presence in Palestine, Lebanon and Syria against offensive Zionism and interventions in Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain and the Persian Gulf against radical Saudi Wahhabism has constructed Iran’s regional strategic culture. To expand on that, by implementing policies in favour of its Islamic realpolitik and ideological positions, Iran subsequently preserves its territorial integrity, national security and regional hegemonic influences. [17]Although some Presidents such as Ahmadinejad preferred to show the iron fist and some Presidents such as Khatami and Rouhani portrayed the velvet glove, both in which is a part of Iran’s diplomacy vehicle.

Policy Motivators

Islamic Republic of Iran’s Foreign policy is a result of overlapping and paradoxical motivations. Iranian state has formed a sequence of relative religious and ideological imperatives and Iran’s national interest. Threat perceptions, ideology, national interests and factional competition are sources of Iran’s foreign policy.[18] In order to get a better understanding on the above mentioned foreign policy derivatives, this paper will analyse them separately.

Threat perceptions of Iran’s foreign security consists of US threats of overthrowing the state, Israel’s offensive actions in the region and ideological derived contests inspired by Wahhabism and other Islamic affiliations. In spite of United States statements on not seeking regime change, Israel’s claim of Iran’s offensive actions and Saudi Arabia’s claim of Iran’s revisionism in the region, Iran finds all of these culturally driven perceptions threatening to its national security. Anti-imperialist culture developed after the Islamic Revolution, anti-Wahhabi positions to claim religious legitimacy and anti-Zionist behaviour to strengthen Iran’s Islamic leadership and deter imminent threats. These three cultures have correspondingly shaped Iran’s foreign policy in the Middle East. In spite of the above, these deterrent leverages are not only defensive against foreign threats, but sometimes are employed by the central state against Islamist extremist movement within the country in which are mostly supported by external actors in favour of rising mass unrests and disrupting the system.

In addition to contemporary perceptions of threat posed by the US, Israel and the GCC[19] states to the principles of the Islamic Revolution, stressing Iran’s old civilisation and rich historic independence, Iran claims a right to be recognised as the hegemonic power of the region. regional hegemonic policies have not only been implemented during the last forty years, even the Shah has undertaken a same strategy against the states around the Persian Gulf. A strategy to empower and legitimise the Iranian states in the region as a dominant political, economic, and military player. Given that, one argues that the history and the culture of Iran is the key element in designing its strategic culture against the Persian Gulf states. [20] Furthermore, regional competition and factional interests also driven the ambitions of Iran to claim the hegemonic power and retain the balance of power. In this context, Ayatollah Khamenei plays the most influential role in the Iranian foreign policy decision making system. According to Iran’s national constitution, the Supreme Leader have the absolute authority in shaping and implementing foreign policy. Having the military support of the IRGC[21], the ideological support of Islamic jurisprudence and social support of the majority, Ayatollah Khamenei is capable of expressing ideology-based strategic decisions in foreign policy.[22] Thus, one can argue that cultural derivatives and Islamic religious positions plus the additional dynamics of the IRGC has proven the prominent presence of culture and ideology in Iran’s foreign policy.

Political Rationale and State Foreign Policy Identity

In light of the above mentioned factors and prominent ideological and security drivers of Iran’s strategic culture, within the contemporary politics of the region Iran tends to prioritise national interests and pragmatism over ideological positions. The traditional aspects of revolutionary Islam against the United States offensive interventions, state sponsored Wahhabism and offensive Zionism is still viable through Iran’s foreign policy; but the system is moderating itself to become more pragmatic in its decision making system rather than relying merely on ideological positions. By assessing the means and the ends of its regional policies, Iran has transformed its foreign policy into a national interest based system via becoming more moderate and rational.[23] Its openness within the context of international negotiations, its flexibility in controlling its nuclear deterrence and its rationality in engaging into regional conflicts has illustrated how Iran’s strategic culture is transforming from mere influence of ideological positions into a more rational decision making unit. To get a better understanding on the above mentioned areas, the following examples will demonstrate the political transformation.

In the aftermath of President Ahmadinejad’s populist and conservative period of leadership, and with the rise of moderation through President Rouhani’s presidency, Iran has entered a new era in which had the willingness to engage with the international community. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (Iran Deal) showed Iran’s flexibility in participating in international negotiations and controlling its deterrent nuclear technology. A flexibility in which was approved by all units of decision making in the country; the Supreme Leader, the President, the Supreme National Security Council, the Guardians Council, and the Expediency Discernment Council.[24] Furthermore, in the missile attack operation against American military bases in Iraq after the assassination of General Soleimani, Iran has ones against prioritised pragmatism and national security over ideological positions. Although the casualties of such strikes would have caused another unnecessary conflict in the region, and the US has brutally and undiplomatically assassinated a high ranking general, the Iranians carried out the self-defence mission by preventing any casualties. An action to show the US and the international community the development of pragmatism in its foreign policy. Hence, Iran has demonstrated rationality, morality and respect for values within its discourse of foreign policy, where a mere ideologically driven foreign policy could have resulted an unwanted all-out war.

Conclusion

In conclusion, with respect to the current strategic culture of the Islamic Republic of Iran, and the geopolitics of the Middle East, one can argue that pragmatism has a prominent presence in Iran’s foreign policy. Although the infrastructures of Iran’s foreign policy were constructed by Islamic revolutionary ideas after the revolution, but in time, pragmatism moderated ideological positions in order to prioritise and preserve national interests. Nevertheless, Islamic revolutionary ideology is still prominent in defining Iran’s strategic culture against regional threats such as Israel and Saudi Arabia and major threats like the United States. However, in different occasions, the Iran Nuclear Deal (JCPOA), engagements in direct conflicts, nuclear technology, military interference in proxy wars, and political interventions in the region, Islamic Republic of Iran tends to focus more on preserving national interests over the ideology. Hence, this paper argues that ideological flexibilities driven by theological concepts of Shi’ism such as ghayba, ijtihad, and taqiyya enabled the Islamic Republic of Iran and its decision making unit to moderate its foreign policy through these years via empowering pragmatism. Pragmatism in favour of national interests, national security and hegemonic competition in the region. A pragmatic transactional foreign policy in which facilitates the Islamic Republic of Iran in prioritising its national interest in the context of its strategic culture.

[1] Islamic traditional law interpreted from the Quran

[2] Amir Arjomand, 1984. Pp. 228–229.

[3] Independent reasoning of an Islamic Jurist

[4] Occultation of the 12th Imam of Shia Muslims

[5] Precautionary denial of religious beliefs for pragmatic purposes.

[6] Meghan 2008. Pp. 235–237.

[7] Clausen, 2020. Pp. 3–4

[8] HasanKhani, 2017. Pp. 59–61

[9] Jones 2007. Pp. 30

[10] Shaery-Eisenlohr, 2004. Pp. 31

[11] Poursaeid, 2009. Pp. 386–388.

[12] Islamic Jurist in which looks after Muslim communities or countries

[13] Sajedi, 1993, Pp. 81–82

[14] Rieffer-Flanagan, 2009. Pp. 11–14

[15] Barzegar, 2008. Pp. 91.

[16] Arashad, 2004. Pp. 50.

[17] Clausen, 2020. Pp. 3.

[18] Katzman, 2016. Pp. 1–4.

[19] Gulf Cooperation Council — (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE, Bahrein and Oman)

[20] Katzman, 2016. Pp. 4.

[21] Islamic Revolutions Guard Corps

[22] Akbarzadeh & Barry, 2016. Pp. 619–621.

[23] Barzegar, Divsallar, 2017. Pp. 41–43.

[24] Kazemzadeh, 2017. Pp. 201–202.