From a Protégé to a Protagonist:Political Leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei

• Arash M. Akbari is a research associate at the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA). International Law & International Affairs MAIA Programme @JohnsHopkinsSAIS Europe. He writes mostly about Iran, Middle Eastern security affairs and diplomatic relations.

“It is better to be feared than loved, if you cannot be both.”
Niccolò Machiavelli

In the past century, Iran has gone through major political, social and economic reforms. Revolutions, coups, and political movements led by different leaders have all played their roles in transforming this country to the present state. Geopolitically located in the strategic region of the Middle East, Iran has always been involved in tensions, political contests and conflicts. Within the contemporary political model of this region, rich oil resources and high investment potentials can either be an exploitable power dynamic for growth, or a pathway to failure. Focusing on the concept of leadership, I am writing this research paper to portray how different variables, figures and factors has an effect on one’s leadership. How leadership ideas and strategies have constructed the infrastructure of a regime ? Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Hosseini Khamenei, as the most recent leader of the state of Iran, is the protagonist of this research. Avoiding any political bias, prejudice and favouritism, I am analysing Ayatollah Khamenei’s journey through his leadership. Transition to power, maintaining power and retaining his leadership are the stages that I will critically discuss, in order to understand his logic, his ideology, his policies and consequently, his leadership.

Introduction

Political leadership is a phenomenon relying on a combination of personal characteristics, social construct, political vision and ideological assumptions. These principles are the reason why some people emerge as political leaders and some not. This article will approach the phenomenon of political leadership mainly in terms of Iran’s contemporary nation state and Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei’s political and theological leadership as the head of state. To expand on that, citing Weber’s discourse of leadership and Nye’s theory of hard and soft power, this paper will illustrate Ayatollah Khamenei’s model of leadership. Studying anthropological and psychological requirements of political leadership, it is suggested that the lack of personal charisma and disfunction of social construction can cost a leader his leadership. However, political leaders may implement other policies and design certain strategies in order to save their leadership. By analysing the above mentioned, this paper will argue how has Ayatollah Khamenei been able to sustain his leadership and retain his political legitimacy in the absence of personal charisma?

In addition to the sociological aspects of Khamenei’s political leadership, and the patrimonial traditional legitimacy of his lead after ‘Ayatollah Khomeini’[1]; he has implemented certain strategies in order to deflect threats from his leadership and retain his power. Expanding his circle of influence across the region has been acting as a protection leverage for Khamenei’s political leadership. In light of the above, this article will argue how beneficial were the two notions of promotion of sectarianism and military regionalism, in expanding Iran’s influence and specifically Khamenei’s leadership agendas across the region; both of which are fundamental principles of Khamenei’s political leadership. In order to portray Khamenei’s willingness to expand his regional theocratic influence, this article will define the title of ‘Wali Al-Amr e Muslemin’[2], and its implication for Ayatollah Khamenei’s political leadership and theological legitimacy.

Subsequently, defensive neo-classical realist strategies based on Machiavellian realist ideology and Hobbesian state of nature have also been included in Khamenei’s leadership principles. This essay will argue how developments of IRGC[3] branches, defensive ballistic missile capabilities, and the nuclear programme are all part of the deterrence strategy of the state, and Khamenei’s leadership. In other words, the forward defence strategy against foreign threats. This essay will also discuss how the above mentioned defensive realist notions where implemented in domestic policies as well as their parallel implementations in Iran’s foreign policy vehicle. Hence, the question that remains is how Ali Khamenei’s leadership has been benefited from the above policy implementations, and how has he been able to sustain his leadership and retain his political legitimacy in the absence of Ayatollah Khomeini’s charisma.

Vali e Faqīh

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a democratic republic state, governed by the President and his cabinet as the executive branch, the Parliament as the legislative branch, and the Judicial branch for courts and law enforcement. Theocracy and presidential democracy are the twin pillars of the Iranian constitution. A constitution that is a combination of the national law and the Islamic Shari’a[4] law. Above all the governing branches of the state, the head of state is the supreme leader, the highest ranking religious and political authority within the state. ‘Vali e Faqīh’ is the head of state and ‘Velayat-e Faqīh’ is the state itself which is ruled by a ‘Faqīh’[5].

In 1979, after the Islamic Revolution and the fall of the monarchy, Ayatollah Khomeini obtained the ‘Vali e Faqīh’ position and the state of Iran became his ‘Velayat’[6]. The Islamic law of Shari’a merged into the constitution, legitimising the power of Vali e Faqīh. These provisional changes to the constitution of a sovereign state were results of the “evolution of Islamism”[7] throughout the past century’s resistance against imperialism and modernisation. From Sheikh Nouri[8] in early twentieth century to Fadayian[9] and Khomeini in 1940’s and 50’s. The 1979 Islamic Revolution was the emergence point of the politicised populist islam which introduced and legitimised the concept of Vali e Faqīh, and the political leadership of a cleric figure. Considering Ayatollah Khomeini’s strong charisma, sense of identity, and inspirational social construct amongst the population, the expansion of political Islamism after the revolution was inevitable. To elaborate on that, in the newly revolutionised society of Iran, the population was significantly influenced by Khomeini’s charisma in leadership that Vali e Faqīh’s anti-imperialist ideology became people’s dominant ideology. This was the beginning of politicised populist Islamic leadership, and the appearance of Vali e Faqīh’s political power dynamics.

Seeing that, the theological aspect of Vali e Faqīh is also playing in inspirational role in allocating this position amongst the society and enabling Vali e Faqīh to exploit the social power dynamics from the population. Iran is an Islamic country consisting of majority of Shia population. Pragmatism is the fundamental principle of Velayat e Faqīh which gives the responsibility of leading the nation to the Vali e Faqīh, until Mahdi[10] appear from the heavens and take control of the Ummah[11]. This belief is the infrastructure of Shi’a Islam which is being ideologically structured and implemented in Islamic Republic of Iran. In light of the above, the concept of being Mahdi’s representative in leadership gives Vali e Faqīh a theological legitimacy and a holy charismatic social construct.[12] Khomeini facilitated this theological charismatic identity into a pragmatic politicised populist ideology which designed the contemporary Iranian constitution. Thus, Vali e Faqīh becomes Iran’s highest ranking political authority, and highest ranking cleric figure.

Road to Power

In the aftermath of the Islamic revolution, Ali Khamenei went through various theological, military and political pathways, trying to stay close to the inner circle of power and gaining leadership experiences. Joining the IRGC and commanding military operation in Iran-Iraq war, followed by seven years of presidency after the assassination of Mohammad Ali Rajaei[13] and parallelly participating at the Majles-e Khobregân-e Rahbari[14] which is an institution symbolically overlooking on the matters of supreme leadership. As Mavani states, the political, theological and military experiences are not solely adequate for someone to obtain the supreme leadership position.
A combination of all the above factors is the requirement for the next supreme leader of the revolution to be both legitimate and experienced enough to rule the nation.[15] After the death of Ayatollah Khomeini, followed by the death, imprisonment, and house arrests of other legitimate candidates for leadership. Ali Khamenei was introduced by Ayatollah Hashemi Rafsanjani[16] at the Assembly of Experts as the only suitable and legitimate person for this position. Although, at that time he was not a grand ayatollah and neither a Marjā[17], thus, he lacked the very first theological criteria to be a fit supreme leader. That is where the challenges of his leadership began. To prove whether or not he is a legitimate leader.

Lack of Charisma

The death of Ayatollah Khomeini and the sudden disappearance of his charismatic leadership in the society, prepared the grounds for the rise of another charismatic leader. Lacking religious criteria for becoming the supreme leader was the first severe stroke to the charisma of Ali Khamenei. Religious majority of the population did not see him theologically legitimate as Ayatollah Khomeini. Therefore, Khamenei had the obligation to obtain back that religious legitimacy and the notion of charismatic leadership. To expand on the above, referring to Weber’s sociologic concept of political leadership, charisma cannot be transferred from one leader to the next one.[18]Hence, Khamenei could have not expected to obtain Khomeini’s charisma for his leadership. Furthermore, the concept of charisma in political leaders is not a stable factor. Many leaders have initiated their leadership with charisma and over a period lost their charismatic influences amongst the society. Thus, Khamenei had to find other strategies and policies to cover his lack of charisma, maintain his legitimacy and retain his leadership.

The beginning of Ali Khamenei’s supreme leadership was parallel to Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency, both in which were Ayatollah Khomeini’s closest comrades, but had different political perspectives and ideological approaches. The days that Rafsanjani was governing the state with ideological reformist and modernising policies, Ali Khamenei as the supreme leader was still implementing conservative radical revolutionary strategies in order to retain the influences of the Islamic revolution amongst the society. Rafsanjani and Khamenei as the representatives of their political parties of reformists and hardliners began to develop disputes and disagreements. Lacking Ayatollah Khomeini’s charisma, Khamenei had to find other measures to dominate his supreme leadership authority over Rafsanjani’s presidential authorities. To illustrate the tensions between the two poles of power in Iran, Jacobsen[19] suggests that there were too many overlapping spheres of control that the supreme leader and the president began to develop disputes in dealing with internal and foreign affairs. Given that Khamenei did not have Khomeini’s charisma amongst the society, and he could have not exploited the social power dynamics of the population, he began to develop some personal connections and expanded his network within the circle of power to dominate his leadership over presidential authority of Hashemi Rafsanjani.

Personal Loyal Networks

The development of a loyal network to secure Khamenei’s legitimacy for leadership was need across the state to preserve his power and retain his authority. The lack of charisma frustrated Ali Khamenei and subsequently boosted him to construct his network and loyal connections. According to Nader, Thaler, and Bohandy[20] “Khamenei has taken advantage of Iran’s informal and often inchoate political system to cement his personal power and authority at the expense of the Nezam’s[21] various decision-making bodies”. Along the process of networking and alliance recruitment within the structure of the state, the newly organised IRGC[22] and theological cleric institutions were two areas in which Ayatollah Khamenei invested the most. Strong ties with the IRGC would enable Ali Khamenei to be militarily agile and have a concrete security assurance. Moreover, ties with the clergy association, the assembly of cleric experts and the guardian’s council would religiously and politically make his power invincible and untouchable. Therefore, in return to some significant political and financial gains, these sectors of the state began to politically, economically and militarily strengthening Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership and sustaining his legitimacy.

By capturing the economic, political, and religious power dynamics of leadership, Ayatollah Khamenei began to introduce a new phase of ‘absolutism’ in Iran’s politics. The concept of absolutism[23] refers to the fact that Ayatollah Khamenei strategically controls the main branches of power within the internal power dimensions of the state. Fazili also illustrates that suppressing popular reformist movements is Khamenei’s main strategy to retain his leadership. In contrast, obtaining a more conservative approach on this matter, majority of the religious population of Iran still believe the concept of Velayat e Faqīh and the right of the Faqīh himself to rule over the nation. Building on that, this is the reason for the importance of religious and theological legitimacy. Hence, gaining religious legitimacy through strong connections and alliance networking with the clergy association, enabled Ayatollah Khamenei to exploit the religious power dynamics of the religious majority of the population, in order to retain his leadership and maintain his legitimacy. Although, the notion of charisma was still missing in Khamenei’s leadership, but religious social construct was a major step in influencing and aligning public assumptions with his leadership.

Mahdism, Religious Legitimacy and Sectarianism

Considering the Shi’a religious majority of the Iranian population, a single dominant ideology was needed for the supreme leader to control over the main cluster of the nation. Subsequently, the notion of ‘Mahdism’[24] was introduced and developed by the cleric community amongst the society. Through their position amongst the society, Islamic scholars and cleric figures such as Ayatollah Yazdi[25], Mesbah[26] and Makarem e Shirazi[27] were the cleric figures spreading and advertising the notion of Mahdism amongst the society. To expand on that, Yaluh[28] describes the role of Ayatollah Khamenei in the above discourse as the legitimate representative of the 12th occult Imam Mahdi to lead the Muslim world. By illustrating the above mentioned image amongst the religious majority society, Ali Khamenei gained a sense of religious legitimacy to strengthen his leadership and regain the power dynamics that he lost due to his lack of charisma.

Furthermore, touching back on the title of Vali e Faqīh, and the Shi’a interpretation of Islam, the Ummah or the Muslim community must be led by the Prophet himself. After the death of Prophet Mohammad, 12 Shi’a Imams had the legitimacy to rule over the Muslim community respectively. According to Behniafar[29] the position of Vali e Faqīh in the Islamic Republic jurisprudence has been interpreted as Imam Mahdi’s legitimate representative in today’s world. Vali e Faqīh has the responsibility to rule and lead over the Muslim community and distinguish the right and wrong for the Ummah. A pragmatic interpretation is also being employed in the establishment of Mahdism in Islamic Republic of Iran. A pragmatic authority of Vali e Faqīh to make decisions in any field where the interest and the security of the Ummah is challenged and threatened. Decision makings in all political, economic, military and social aspects of the governance in the state. Hence, considering the tensions between the Shi’a and Sunni theologies, these extended authorities of Ayatollah Khamenei challenges the religious balance of power in order to retain his power and sustain his religious legitimacy. Therefore, as stated above, Khamenei exploited the power dynamics of the society to introduce himself as the leader of the Muslim world and proportionally promote sectarianism to dominate his religious legitimacy over other highly influential Islamic figures in the region.

In contrast to the patrimonial and traditional factors of retainment for Ayatollah Khamenei’s political leadership, promotion of sectarianism has been a facilitating strategy fully initiated, directed and controlled by the supreme leader himself. As Boroumand[30]also suggests, promotion of sectarianism has been a permanent principle of the Islamic Revolution ideology. Sculpturing a mutual ideological and theological evil for the society through the expansion of sectarianism allows Ayatollah Khamenei to exploit the power dynamics of the society when people are vulnerable against a threat. Creation of an external threat has always united the people in favour of their leader. As Weber elaborated on the notion of political leadership, vulnerable societies always seek for a powerful leader. Thus, by possessing potential external threats through promotion of sectarianism, Ali Khamenei obtained leadership legitimacy from his nation to lead them against those external threats. He facilitated the notion of a common enemy to gain legitimacy. In addition to the gain of internal legitimacy amongst the religious majority in which retained and reinforced his political power, Khamenei also adopted the policy of promotion of sectarianism in his foreign policy to extend his influences beyond the Iranian borders into the region of the Middle East.

Regional Influences

In parallel to attempts for gaining religious legitimacy and strengthening pillars of his leaderships, Ali Khamenei sees a major potential dynamic in the structure of the IRGC. A paramilitary organization which is loyal to the revolution, leadership and the ideology of Velayat e Faqīh. The compliance to the main ideology of the revolution and their loyalty to the supreme leader himself turned this paramilitary group into Khamenei’s trusted lever of power. According to Alfoneh[31], the practical theorem structuring the IRGC is to employ ‘clerical commissars’ faithful and loyal to the ideology of the Islamic revolution and theological indoctrination to maintain control over this paramilitary group. To expand on that, Alfoneh also states “In most authoritarian regimes, political indoctrination enables civilian influence over the armed forces.” In the same context, after the Iran Iraq war, Ayatollah Khamenei allocated people such as Rahim Safavi and Qasem Soleimani two high ranking generals as the chief commanders of the IRGC, both in which had compliance with the ideological derivatives of the Islamic revolution. Furthermore, allocation of such faithful and loyal personals assisted the leadership to develop a reliable force for security purposes.

Promoting spiritual, ethical and divine values of the revolution amongst the structure of the IRGC utilised the power dynamics of the religious society to establish a force consisting of religious, loyal and professional youngsters. Based on the four principles of obedience to the supreme leader Ali Khamenei; religious faith to Shi’a Islam; revolutionary characteristics; and fellowship to People’s army[32], the IRGC built a social construct from the Islamic revolutionary behaviours. Subsequently, cleric representatives of the supreme leader consistently visit IRGC bases to make sure that these ideological, religious and nationalistic core values are being implemented amongst these forces. Hence, going back to the main objective of this article, the presence of such military forces with ideological derivatives assists Iran’s political leadership to sustain the balance of power. In other words, IRGC’s ideological and military tendance amongst the society and the political system establishes a sense of systematic oppressive legitimacy in which allows Ayatollah Khamenei to retain his leadership in the absence of charisma.

Seeing the potential dynamics of the IRGC, political leadership in Iran began to design a broader field of activities for these forces. In order to construct an illusional charismatic authority and systematic legitimacy, the political leadership employed the power dynamics of the IRGC in political, economic and social activities. Following that order from the supreme leader and after the publication of Revolutionary Guard’s updated doctrine; IRGC commanders began to express their political affiliations; participate publicly and privately in economic activities; and promoting the social construct of local branches of these forces under the structure of Basij[33]. In addition, Banerjea[34] discusses that the expansion of the influences and inspirations of the IRGC expanded even more by entering into the intelligence sector and introducing foreign military operations. Intelligence overlapping spheres of responsibility and in some cases institutionalised heirachy of the IRGC intelligence services undermined the intelligence services of the government.[35]The institutionalised heirachy given to the IRGC by Ayatollah Khamenei. A legitimate supervisory ability to control over other branches of power within the system. Secondly, the official introduction of Quds Forces[36]which portrayed the capabilities of these forces to operate beyond the Iranian borders. At this point, Ayatollah Khamenei began to directly and proportionately influence the so called “outsiders” and the region of the Middle East.

IRGC, Regional Interventions and the Strength Ayatollah’s Leadership

The emergence of Quds Forces and General Soleimani as their leading commander introduced a new era to the regional politics. Gaining experiences of irregular conflicts and guerrilla warfare during Iran-Iraq war; Soviet-Afghan war; conflicts in Lebanon; and the Bosnian war, the Quds Forces began to play an influential role in implementing Ayatollah Khamenei’s policies across the region. In other words, the Quds Forces began to strengthen the pillars of Ayatollah Khamenei’s political leadership. The Quds Forces designed a new in-dept strategic defensive agenda beyond the Iranian borders and formulated a defensive realist theory in dealing with tensions in neighbouring states, to be able to systematically control most of foreign threats.[37] By the same token, Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, Syria and most recently Yemen became Iran’s strategic depth of national security. Subsequently, the broader the military influence of the Islamic Revolution extended into the region; the more legitimate Ayatollah Khamenei’s political leadership become. Be that as it may, Khamenei constructed a power lever for his political and Islamic revolution’s ideological dominance in the region, against the presence of mutual enemies, the US and Israel.

Ideological derivatives and military expansion facilitated Ayatollah Khamenei’s political leadership to obtain strategic advantages beyond the Iranian borders. Constructing a common enemy allowed him to build himself a legitimate sphere of influence to retain his leadership. Within the above mentioned political agenda, anti-Zionist and anti-Imperialist ideological derivates played a vital role in designing Iran’s foreign policy and scheming Iran’s strategic culture. The Quds Forces are the major branch of Iranian military that are engaged directly in proxy conflicts with American imperialist and Israeli Zionist combatant branches. Stated by Yvette[38], Islamic Revolution’s ideological doctrine against a common enemy constructed an ideological identity for the Supreme Leader. An ideological identity that legitimises Khamenei’s political leadership in leading the resistance against the US and Israel. Subsequently, Ayatollah Khamenei have been able to exploit the power dynamics of constructing a common enemy in his favour to retain unity amongst his leadership and maintain his legitimate leadership. Based on Aristotle’s theory of common enemy, Khamenei was able to exploit social potentials of the nation by introducing a common enemy. Thus, the Quds Forces became the major actor in confronting the major threat. In order to secure the leadership. In addition to IRGC’s military capabilities and strategic interventions in the region for the favour of Ayatollah Khamenei’s political leadership and regional legitimacy, this paramilitary organization began to develop its activities within the industrial and economic fields of the country. Industrial activities and economic developments utilised this group to not only fund themselves, but to become a treasury for Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership. The two military; industrial; and economic bases of ‘Khatam al-Anbiya’ and ‘Khatam al-Osia’ are the major industrial and economic establishments of the IRGC. These two economic agencies invest on wide range of industrial potentials such as the steel; coal; defence; oil; transportation; pharmaceutical; and car industries.

“The subtext of this apparent economic populism is, of course, the IRGC’s control of Iran’s shadow economy the illicit smuggling net- works, kickbacks, no-bid contracts, and the accumulation of wealth by its senior officials that remains largely unseen by the Iranian population.”[39]

Economic power dynamics of the financial branch of the IRGC is capable to obtain a high revenue and provide the state with financial support. Thus, economic; military; industrial; and political pillars of the IRGC shaped a supporting foundation dock for Ayatollah Khamenei’s leadership to be independent from any particular foreign state in general. In other words, IRGC’s capabilities enabled Ayatollah Khamenei to proportionately retain his leadership in the absence of Ayatollah Khomeini’s charisma and his social construct.

Defensive Neo-realism and the Notion of Deterrence

Based on Hobbesian state of nature, in a world of anarchy, conflicts between states are inevitable, and states must implement a sceptical foreign policy to pre-emptively deter imminent foreign threats before occurrence. In order to establish a permanent deterrent security regions or systems must accomplish a state of balance of power. The balance of power is directly proportional to inevitability of interstate conflicts. The more concrete the balance of power is, the less difficult it becomes for states to prevent conflicts.[40] Talking about the post revolution and post war Iran, Khamenei sought for a strategy to construct the balance of power and strengthen the infrastructures for the development of a deterrence lever. Lacking Ayatollah Khomeini’s charisma, Khamenei needed a political leverage to retain his leadership. Hence, developing ballistic missiles capabilities and atomic technology became Khamenei’s first priority. As he believed foreign stability and a powerful deterrent foreign policy would correspondingly strengthen the state from inside as well. Disabling other states from proposing imminent threats to the national security will subsequently secure the state from internal threats.

Applying Joseph Nye’s theory of combining hard and soft power[41] and building on the illustration of defensive neo-realism, the process of strengthening and retaining political power required Ayatollah Khamenei to invest in hard power as much as he invested in soft power. In addition to ideological derivatives of his political leadership, Ali Khamenei has been relying on the expansion of defensive capabilities through the IRGC and the National Army, both in which are under supreme leader’s direct command. By the same token, Ayatollah Khamenei implemented defensive realist strategies in developing ballistic missile capabilities and nuclear progressive technology, in order to maximize security through maximization of power. Ballistic missiles from short ranges of 300–500 kilometres[42] and long range ballistic missiles with a range up to 2500 kilometres[43]. Furthermore, these defensive deterrent capabilities have constructed a stable confidence for Khamenei’s leadership in which prevents any foreign interventions of domestic movements to destabilize its pillars of leadership.

In light of the above, revisionist manners of Iranian political leadership beyond its borders is also explained by Ayatollah Khamenei’s defensive realist ideology. Disruption of the current world order and regional balance of power will eventually result the involvement of Iran in the new regional order as the main pillar of power and the main player. Illustrating Iran’s strategic culture with regards to Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and the GCC states shows the temptations of Tehran to disrupt the balance of power in favour of gaining regional legitimacy and institutional charisma.[44] Through the use of force, internal systematic security, and foreign strategic culture based on deterrence, Ali Khamenei has established a secure leadership which subsequently fill the gaps for his lack of charisma. In other words, maximization of power has given Ayatollah Khamenei enough legitimacy that he does not need the presence of charismatic leadership.

Deterrence and Foreign Policy

In the context of Nye’s theory of hard and soft power, since Ayatollah Khamenei has obtained atomic and ballistic missile deterrent capabilities, he has been able to apply those deterrent leverages onto his foreign policy. Gaining nuclear and ballistic defensive capabilities has provided Islamic Republic with an upper-hand or an advantage in dealing with diplomatic agendas. Ayatollah Khamenei’s foreign policy vehicle has rapidly utilised these advantages to gain the maximum points on negotiations. From Velayati[45], Mottaki[46] and Jalili’s[47] hardliner foreign policy to Kharrazi[48]and Zarif’s[49] moderate strategies, the common middle ground for all administrations was to gain the maximum advantage by facilitating atomic and ballistic defensive deterrent policies into negotiations as a pressure lever to accomplish so called a ‘good deal’.[50] Although, hardliners and moderates have different approaches in utilising the notion of deterrence. This is where Rieffer-Flanagan illustrates the ‘two level foreign policy’, in which hardliners use the deterrence leverage as a direct threat to the west and Israel, but moderates tend to implement deterrent leverages as a solution for initiating negotiations and developing international talks. Both in which are facilitating the legitimisation of Iranian political leadership and assisting Ayatollah Khamenei to cover his lack of charisma.

In light of the above, furthermore on the Foreign policy implemented by the Islamic republic of Iran, and in addition to atomic and ballistic deterrence leverages, Ayatollah Khamenei has also employed a strategy of redirecting foreign military interference of the IRGC into his foreign policy. To expand on that, the creation of ideological paramilitary organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas and Hashd al-Sha’abi and their broad geographic range of activities from Lebanon and Palestine to Iraq and Syria has allowed Ayatollah Khamenei to have a wider influence on the region. Moreover, this strategic influence of Khamenei’s political leadership on regional states allows Khamenei to exploit the power dynamics of these alliances and employ them in his foreign policy.[51] As an example assisting the United States during Hashemi Rafsanjani’s presidency to negotiate for the Lebanon hostage crisis; or military cooperation in Iraq and Syria against ISIS.

Political dynamics gained from the presence of such paramilitary organizations and ideological influence allows Ayatollah Khamenei to secure his footsteps in the region and obtain a legitimised political power. Hence, the strategic culture of Iran against regional states and the bargain foreign policy with the west has empowered Khamenei’s political leadership by portraying a powerful image from Iran as a major player in the region. In spite of all international tensions, lack of personal charisma, economic instabilities caused by unilateral sanctions and the oppositional movements, Islamic republic and more specifically, Ayatollah Khamenei has been able to retain his leadership.

Conclusion

Political leadership of Ayatollah Khamenei consists of different policies and establishment of different approaches throughout his three decades of leadership. He has been experiencing different challenges in which he sometimes managed to overcome and sometimes had to accept the defeat. The theological contest for his legitimacy as Ayatollah Khomeini’s successor; achieving the dominant power of supreme leadership; demising the executive capabilities of the presidential power; organising the coalition and alliance between the IRGC and its regional militias; and formulating Iran’s foreign policy based on the Islamic revolution ideology has all been a phase within Ayatollah Khamenei’s road to power and retainment of his leadership. This essay was able to illustrate the four political, social, theological and military deterrent strategies employed by Ayatollah Khamenei in which enabled him to retain his political leadership and conserve the fundamental pillars of the Islamic revolution. The implementation of these practices and interpellation of Islamic revolutionary ideology allowed Ayatollah Khamenei to cover his lack of charisma.

Weber states that charisma cannot be transferred from one leader to his successor and it is not a permanent personal element for a leader. Referring to Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership, this paper suggests that although Ali Khamenei does not possess Ayatollah Khomeini’s charisma, he has been able to preserve his leadership and his leading identity. Despite the fact that he does not have a personal charisma to influence his nation; theological derivatives; ideological assumptions; regional military influences; and the development of defensive deterrence enabled Ayatollah Khamenei to secure his position and lead the state. Through the establishment of these strategies, Ayatollah Khamenei has been able to be legitimate and suppressive at the same time. A combination of hard and soft power employed by Ayatollah Khamenei has allowed him to hold a democratic presidential and parliamentary election every four years, while dominantly lead the nation as the sole head of state. Subsequently, this paper illustrated the strategic approach that enabled Ayatollah Khamenei to exploit the political and social power dynamics of his leadership in favour of retaining his own leadership. Demising the presidential authorities; making changes to the constitution; creating a loyal close network; coalition with the IRGC; expanding deterrent strategies; and development of defensive capabilities are all collaborating factors in allowing Ayatollah Khamenei to sustain his leadership and retain his legitimacy in the absence of Ayatollah Khomeini’s charisma.

Seeing that Ayatollah Khamenei lacks Ayatollah Khomeini’s charismatic leadership, constitutional changes over the past thirty years on his sphere of control has gradually enabled Ayatollah Khamenei to preserve his theological position while controlling strategic institutions under his direct command and influence. Ayatollah Khamenei is the commander in chief for all the military and intelligence forces. His reliable and loyal security network of armed forces and intelligence allows him to have a dominant control over all available weapons within the armed forces. IRGC, National Army and militias such as Basij are all part of Ayatollah Khamenei’s military sphere of influence. In addition to the full control over all the guns, full control of the national broadcast television also enables the Supreme Leader to influence social contracts between the state and the people. Judiciary system is another stronghold of Ayatollah Khamenei as he has full control over the head of the judiciary system and all the prisons. Appointing the chief justice of Iran every eight to ten years allows Ayatollah Khamenei to maintain his control over the judicial branch of power in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

In addition to all the security, broadcast and judiciary spheres of control, Ayatollah Khamenei also controls the five economic institutions in which are known to be the financial pillars of the state. Bonyad-e-Mostaz’afan; Bonyad-e-Shahid; Bonyad-e-Panzdah-e-Khordad; Komite-e-Emdad; and Setad-e-Ejraei-e-Farman-e-Emam[52] all in which are financial institutions directly controlled by the office of the Supreme Leader. These financial agencies enable Ayatollah Khamenei to preserve a major financial potential to be used for different political, social and theological agendas. The military, intelligence, judiciary and financial loyal networks of Ayatollah Khamenei, as well as his theological influence over the Friday Prayer Imams of Iran facilitates Iran’s Supreme Leader and the Commander in Chief to have a full control over the vast majority of authorities. This broad state of responsibilities and sphere of control acquires a set of potential political dynamics for Ayatollah Khamenei. Political dynamics in which has been assisting the Supreme Leader in the absence of personal charisma to retain his leadership and sustain his power over the past decades.

[1] First supreme leader of IR Iran — Post Revolution 1979

[2] Islamic Legal Guardian for all the Muslim population

[3] Islamic Revolution Guard Corps — State militia

[4] Islamic Law influenced by the Quran

[5] Religious leader — Guardian of the Islamic jurist

[6] State

[7] Arjomand, S. A. ED. 1984. “From Nationalism To Revolutionary Islam.” Pp 28–35

[8] Cleric revolutionary figure

[9] Radical religious organisation — Fadayian e Eslam

[10] 12th Shia Imam

[11] Islamic Society

[12] Behniafar, Ahmadreza. 2008. “مفهوم ولایت مطلقه فقیه در قانون اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران” Pp 52

[13] Second President of the Islamic Republic of Iran

[14] The Assembly of Cleric Experts

[15] Mavani, Hamid. 2013. “Khomeini’s Concept of Governance of the Jurisconsult “ Pp 219–221

[16] Head of the Assembly of Experts

[17] Religious leader/scholar

[18] Bensman, J. and Givant, M. 1975. “Charisma and Modernity.” Pp 570–614

[19] Jacobsen, Donavan. 2008. “The Rise and Fall of Presidential Power in Iran.”

[20] Nader, Alireza, David E. Thaler, and S. R. Bohandy. 2011. “Factor 3: Khamenei’s Personal Network.” Pp. 31–32

[21] The regime

[22] Islamic Revolution Guard Corps

[23] Fazili, Yousra Y. 2010. “Between Mullahs’ Robes and Absolutism: Conservatism in Iran.” Pp. 41

[24] Shi’a religious view of the occult 12th Imam (Mahdi) governing the world

[25] Ayatollah Mohammad Yazdi — Islamic scholar and Marja

[26] Ayatollah Mohammad Taghi Mesbah — Marja

[27] Ayatollah Naser Makarem Shirazi — Scholar and Marja

[28] Yaluh, Rashid. 2011. “Mahdism in Contemporary Iran: Ahmadinejad and the Occult Imam” Pp. 13

[29] Behniafar, Ahmadreza. 2008. “مفهوم ولایت مطلقه فقیه در قانون اساسی جمهوری اسلامی ایران” Pp. 49–52

[30] Boroumand, Ladan. 2005. “The Role of Ideology.” Pp. 58

[31] Alfoneh, Ali. 2009. “Introduction of the Revolutionary Guards” Pp. 1150–1155

[32] “Interview with Hojjat al-Eslam Mohammad- Reza Toyserkani” Fasl-Nameh-ye Morrabian (Qom), no. 27

[33] Subordinate social forces of the IRGC — Local

[34] Banerjea, Udit. 2015. “Revolutionary Intelligence: The Expanding Intelligence Role of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.” Pp. 99–100

[35] Ministry of Intelligence — Vezarat e Etela’at

[36] Foreign operational forces of the IRGC — Sepah e Qods

[37] Uskowi, Nader. 2018. “The Evolving Strategy of Iran in Syria: A Looming Conflict with Israel.” Pp. 3–4

[38] Yvette, Hovsepian-Bearce. 2015. “The Political Ideology of Ayatollah Khamenei” Pp. 2–5

[39] Wehrey, F., JD. Green, B. Nichiporuk, Alireza Nader, Lydia Hansell, Rasool Nafisi, and S. R. Bohandy. 2009. “Economic Expansion: The IRGCʹs Business Conglomerate and Public Works.” Pp. 59–60

[40] Treviño, Rusty. 2013. “Is Iran an Offensives Realist or a Defensive Realist? A Theoretical Reflection on Iranian Motives for Creating Instability.”Pp. 383–4

[41] Nye, Joseph S. 2009. “Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power.” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 4 (2009): 160–63.

[42] Shahab and Fateh series

[43] Sejil, Ghader and Khoramshahr series

[44] Barzegar, Keyhan. Rezaei, Masoud. 2016. راهبرد دفاعی ایران از منظرآیت الله خامنه ای [Iran’s Defence Strategy through Ayatollah Khamenei’s vision]. Pp. 3

[45] Ali Akbar Velayati — Former Foreign Minister

[46] Manouchehr Mottaki — Former Foreign Minister

[47] Saeid Jalili — Former Foreign Minister

[48] Kamal Kharrazi- Former Foreign Minister

[49] Mohammad Javad Zarif — Current Foreign Minister

[50] Rieffer-Flanagan, Barbara Ann. 2009. “Islamic Realpolitik: Two-Level Iranian Foreign Policy.” Pp. 21–22

[51] Saikal, Amin. 2019. “Iran Rising : The Survival and Future of the Islamic Republic.” Pp. 7

[52] All these Financial Institutions are directly controlled by the office of the Supreme Leader of Iran (Beyt-e-Rahbari)